Case studies

FTX bankruptcy: what court filings say about failed controls

The first interim report on control failures at the FTX exchanges, filed in the Delaware bankruptcy court on April 9, 2023, describes a group with no independent finance function, no internal audit, no reliable books and weak custody of customer crypto assets. This page sets out what the filing documents, then separates a short editorial section on lessons.

Scope and sources

Everything in the facts sections below comes from one primary document: the “First Interim Report of John J. Ray III to the Independent Directors on Control Failures at the FTX Exchanges,” dated April 9, 2023 and filed as an exhibit in Case No. 22-11068 (Bankr. D. Del.). Mr. Ray was named chief executive of the debtors after the bankruptcy filing. The report is therefore the debtors’ own account, written by new management and its advisers, not the finding of an independent court-appointed examiner. The report says it is a high-level overview, does not cover every failure, and that the work was still continuing. Allegations about individuals are described here only as the report describes them, and criminal liability is a matter for the courts.

Timeline

Date What the filing records
2017 Alameda Research founded; owned 90% by Sam Bankman-Fried and 10% by Gary Wang
2019 FTX.com founded and organized in Antigua
January 2020 FTX.US founded
Late December 2020 Group learns FTX.US must be audited; policies are drafted in about 24 hours
November 2, 2022 Weakness at Alameda becomes public, nine days before the filing
November 11, 2022 The FTX Group files for Chapter 11 protection
April 9, 2023 First interim report on control failures is issued

Governance and management

According to the report, management and governance were largely limited to three people, Sam Bankman-Fried, Nishad Singh and Gary Wang, with Bankman-Fried seen as having the final voice on significant decisions. Apart from a few acquired businesses (LedgerX, FTX Japan and Embed Clearing), the group lacked independent, experienced finance, accounting, human resources, information security or cybersecurity staff, and had no internal audit function. The report calls board oversight effectively non-existent.

It also describes the group as a web of parallel corporate chains rather than a structure under one parent, with no comprehensive organizational chart before the end of 2021 and, at the time of filing, no current and complete list of employees. The report gives two examples of internal pushback: the president of FTX.US resigned after a protracted disagreement over delegation of authority and management structure, and a lawyer was terminated within three months of being hired after raising concerns about Alameda’s controls.

Finance and accounting

The report states that at its peak the group operated in 250 jurisdictions, controlled tens of billions of dollars in assets and handled as many as 26 million transactions per day.

  • Key roles such as chief financial officer, chief risk officer, global controller and chief internal auditor were missing at some or all critical entities. There were no dedicated financial risk, audit or treasury departments.
  • Almost all basic accounting was done by a small outside accounting firm. The report found no evidence that anyone evaluated whether it was suited to the work.
  • Fifty-six entities produced no financial statements. Thirty-five used QuickBooks, which the report describes as software designed for small and mid-sized businesses, with data moved in by hand.
  • About 80,000 transactions sat in a catch-all account labeled “Ask My Accountant.” Crypto holdings were often recorded under the generic entry “investments in cryptocurrency.”
  • Statements of cash flows, schedules of customer entitlements and daily liquidity reports did not exist or were not prepared regularly. Reliable lists of bank accounts, wallets and authorized signatories were not kept.
  • Approvals were often given through Slack or Signal, sometimes with disappearing messages. The report says expenses were approved by emoji and that approvals for transfers in the tens of millions of dollars left thin records or none.
  • Tens of millions of dollars moved from an Alameda bank account to a personal account of Bankman-Fried in 2021 and 2022. The report says the transfers were documented as loans in promissory notes but recorded in the ledger as “Investment in Subsidiaries: Investments-Cryptocurrency.”

The report quotes an internal message in which Bankman-Fried described Alameda as “unauditable” and said the firm sometimes found $50 million of assets it had lost track of.

Alameda’s special treatment on the exchange

The report says the FTX.com code and customer database gave Alameda privileges no other customer had. Settings called “borrow,” “can_withdraw_below_borrow” and “allow_negative” meant Alameda could trade and withdraw with a negative balance and was exempt from automatic liquidation. The report says the allow_negative setting was added on July 31, 2019. As of the petition date, retail customers mostly had a borrow value of zero, preferred customers and market makers up to $150 million, and Alameda alone $65 billion. The report adds that missing database logs made it impossible to say when or by whom the $65 billion value was set.

Digital asset custody and security

The report lists failures in custody and cybersecurity. The group kept virtually all crypto in hot wallets, did not use multi-signature or multi-party computation controls as intended, and stored private keys in places such as AWS Secrets Manager. It identified keys to more than $100 million of Ethereum stored in plain text on a server. It says over a dozen people had access to the central omnibus wallets, multi-factor authentication was not enforced on Google Workspace or the password manager, and the exchanges and Alameda shared one AWS account.

The report also says statements to outsiders about cold storage were false. It quotes a 2022 description of an “air gapped” cold-wallet system that, the report says, did not exist. A cyberattack on the petition date drained approximately $432 million of assets, which the report links to the missing controls. It says FTX.US lost about $139 million of that amount because its migration to a separate AWS account was unfinished.

Numbers in one table

Item Figure in the report
Jurisdictions at peak 250
Peak transactions per day Up to 26 million
Entities with no financial statements 56
Entities using QuickBooks 35
Unprocessed “Ask My Accountant” entries About 80,000
Alameda borrow value, petition date $65 billion
Largest borrow value for other customers $150 million
Drained in the November 2022 breach About $432 million
FTX.US share of that loss About $139 million
Documents reviewed by the debtors Over one million
Employees interviewed 19

Lessons (editorial interpretation)

This section is our reading of the documented facts, not a finding of any court or of the report.

  1. Segregate duties before volume arrives. The report describes a few people who could move money, hire and fire, and overrule advice. Even a small startup can require two people on large payments and keep the person who builds a system separate from the person who checks it.
  2. Hire the finance role early. A company holding other people’s money needs someone responsible for the books, risk and treasury. Our guide on why a start-up needs a CFO covers when that makes sense.
  3. Make approvals traceable. A chat reaction leaves no usable approval record. Keep one system where payments, owners and reasons are written down, and agree on retention rules.
  4. Reconcile. Cash, wallets and customer balances should be tied to independent records on a fixed schedule. See top finance mistakes for the common gaps.
  5. Treat related parties as a control topic. Loans to founders and transfers between affiliates need documents, board review and ledger entries that match their substance.
  6. Check what you tell outsiders. The report describes statements about custody that it says were untrue. Investors and lenders reading a data room, as in board meeting practice, should ask for evidence, not descriptions.
  7. Keep the scale in mind. FTX held customer assets, and most early companies face smaller risks, though the habits above scale down well.

Sources and limits

  • First Interim Report of John J. Ray III to the Independent Directors on Control Failures at the FTX Exchanges, April 9, 2023, filed as Doc 1242-1 in Case No. 22-11068-JTD (Bankr. D. Del.), read via courtlistener.com.

Figures are as stated in that report and were checked against the filing in November 2026; they relate to dates in 2022 and earlier, and later filings may differ. This page is general information, not legal, accounting or investment advice.