VC

Reading a venture capital term sheet clause by clause

A venture capital term sheet is a few pages, and every line is a decision about money or control. For a startup founder, the clauses decide who gets paid, who votes and when a sale can be forced, so each one deserves a slow read. This guide reads the NVCA model term sheet in the order it is written and explains each clause in plain words, with a note on what to check. The basics are in term sheet explained. Two clauses have their own guides, liquidation preference and pro rata and anti-dilution, so they get only a pointer here.

Where the model comes from

The National Venture Capital Association publishes model financing documents for free, and its model term sheet for a Series A preferred stock financing is the template most US lawyers start from. The 2020 version says it maps to the NVCA model documents and groups each provision by the document in which it would be found: the certificate of incorporation (the charter), the stock purchase agreement, the investors’ rights agreement, the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement, and the voting agreement. In October 2025 the NVCA announced updates to five of those long-form documents, including new mechanics for tranched financings, so the long forms have moved on since the term sheet was written.

Canadian founders have a close cousin. The Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association publishes Canadian versions of the NVCA documents, including a model term sheet, and says most basic terms are the same or similar. It also says they are a starting point only. The model’s own preliminary note says it is somewhat longer than a typical venture term sheet, so the term sheet you receive may be shorter. Every bracket in the model is a choice someone has to make.

The clause map

The table follows the order of the model term sheet. “What to check” is where founders usually need to slow down.

Clause Plain meaning What to check
Pre-money valuation Sets the price per share and ownership. The model puts the unallocated option pool inside the pre-money Pool size and who bears it
Dividends Whether preferred holders get paid before common Non-cumulative or “as converted” is mild; cumulative adds a growing claim
Liquidation preference Who gets paid first in a sale Multiple, participation, cap: see the liquidation preference guide
Voting rights and board Preferred votes with common, plus board seats it can elect Seat count and who picks the independent
Protective provisions Actions that need preferred holders’ consent Length of the list and the exact wording
Anti-dilution Conversion price adjusts if you sell cheaper shares Weighted average or full ratchet: see anti-dilution
Mandatory conversion Preferred converts to common at a qualified IPO or by vote The IPO price and size hurdles
Pay-to-play (bracketed) Investors who skip a down round lose preferred rights Often helps founders in a down round
Redemption (bracketed) Investors can demand their money back after five years in the model Whether it appears at all
Information and management rights Reports and access for investors above a size threshold The “Major Investor” cutoff
Pro rata right Right to buy into later rounds Threshold and “super” versions
Preferred director approval Board-level vetoes on hiring, debt, IP and similar Whether it overlaps protective provisions
Right of first refusal and co-sale Company, then investors, can buy shares a founder wants to sell Who it covers
Drag-along Forces holders to vote for a sale Who must approve it
Founder and employee vesting When shares are earned Credit for time served, acceleration
No-shop and confidentiality Binds you to one investor for a set time Number of days, renewals

Price, option pool and dividends

The model describes the price per share as a “fully-diluted pre-money valuation,” with an “unallocated and uncommitted” employee option pool sitting inside it. In the model the pool is written as a percentage of the fully diluted post-money capitalization. That detail moves real money.

A hypothetical example: an investor offers $3 million at a $12 million pre-money valuation, and the term sheet sets a 12% pool. The post-money valuation is $15 million, so the investor owns 20% ($3 million divided by $15 million). The pool takes 12% of the post-money. Existing holders keep the remaining 68%. Their stake is worth $10.2 million at that price, so the effective pre-money valuation for the current owners is $10.2 million, not $12 million. If the hiring plan only needs a 6% pool, the same offer leaves existing holders 74%.

Mercury’s founder guide, published in 2022 and updated in May 2026, gives 10% post-money as the founder-friendly pool and 15% to 20% pre-money as the investor-friendly one. Treat them as opening positions, because the right number comes from your hiring plan for the next 18 to 24 months. How equity grants themselves work is in founder equity and stock options.

On dividends the model offers three alternatives: dividends paid with common stock on an as-converted basis, non-cumulative dividends only if the board declares them, or an annual cumulative percentage payable on a sale or redemption. The first two rarely change the outcome. The third adds a claim that grows every year and sits on top of the liquidation preference, which is the case to look at closely.

Board and voting

In the model, preferred stock votes together with common on an as-converted basis, with three exceptions: the right to elect a set number of directors, votes required by law, and the protective provisions. The model’s sample board has a lead-investor designee, a designee of the other investors, a designee of the common holders, the CEO, and one or more independent directors who are mutually acceptable to the other directors.

Cooley GO says a typical post-Series A board has three seats, one investor and two founders, and that board makeup should roughly track the relative control of the cap table (guide last reviewed January 2022). Add up the votes by name, not by number of seats. Then check who chooses the independent seat, who fills a vacancy and whether a founder seat survives the founder’s departure from the company.

Protective provisions

The model’s list is long. As long as a set number or percentage of Series A shares is outstanding, the company cannot do the following without the written consent of the “Requisite Holders”:

  • liquidate, dissolve or sell the company;
  • change the charter or bylaws in a way adverse to the preferred;
  • issue securities that rank equal to or senior to the Series A;
  • redeem shares or pay dividends on other stock, except repurchases from departing employees;
  • take on debt above a set dollar amount, in an optional bracket;
  • create a subsidiary that is not wholly owned, in an optional bracket;
  • change the number of directors, in an optional bracket.

Cooley GO separates the routine vetoes from the ones that matter, such as a veto on future financings or a sale of the company. It also warns about wording: a ban on creating a new series of stock without the investor’s approval can block a financing even though the text never says so. When you read the list, ask whether each item protects the investor’s investment or reaches into operating decisions. Pay special attention to the thresholds, because a consent that needs a majority of a small preferred class is easy for one investor to hold.

The model also has an optional list of matters requiring approval of a preferred director: loans and guarantees, hiring, firing and pay for executive officers, a change in the company’s business, sale or licensing of material technology, and strategic relationships above a dollar threshold. Compare this with the protective provisions list so you are not giving the same veto twice at different levels.

Information rights, pro rata and co-sale

The model gives any “Major Investor (who is not a competitor)” access to the company’s facilities and personnel, annual, quarterly and optionally monthly financial statements, an operating budget thirty days before each fiscal year ends and, as an option, a quarterly capitalization table. Check the dollar line that makes someone a Major Investor, because a low line multiplies reports and also the number of people who can claim a slice of the next round. The competitor carve-out matters most for corporate holders, covered in our corporate venture capital guide.

The pro rata clause in the model lets each Major Investor buy its share of later rounds, based on fully diluted ownership, with unused shares offered to the other Major Investors. Excluded issuances include those on the anti-dilution exceptions list and an IPO. The mechanics, including “super pro rata”, are covered in our pro rata and anti-dilution guide.

The right of first refusal and co-sale clause is about founders and big employee shareholders. For current and future employees holding 1% or more of the common stock, the company and then the investors can buy shares that person proposes to sell, and investors may sell alongside in proportion to their holdings. That is a restriction on your own secondary sales and not a veto on selling the company.

Drag-along

A drag-along is a bracketed term in the model and sits in the voting agreement. It would require holders of preferred stock and all holders of more than 1% of the common stock to vote for a sale or any deal that transfers 50% or more of the voting power, once a defined group approves it. In the model the approval group is the board or the Requisite Holders, and may include a majority of the common shares held by employees. The model also sets two protections: each holder’s liability is several, not joint, and cannot exceed their pro rata share of any claim, and proceeds are allocated as they would be in a liquidation under the charter.

Mercury says a threshold of 75% or more of all shares protects founders. Look at three things: who has to approve, whether the common holders have a say, and whether the sale price clears the liquidation preference stack. The last one is covered in liquidation preference. For how a sale actually pays out, see exits and earn-outs.

Vesting

The model deals with two kinds. Founders’ stock is a bracketed option: a buyback right or vesting on some percentage for the first 12 months after closing, lapsing in equal monthly steps over a further period. Employee options in the model vest 25% after one year, with the remainder monthly over the next 36 months.

A hypothetical example of credit for time served: a founder holds 1,000,000 shares and negotiates 25% credit. At closing 250,000 shares are treated as vested. The other 750,000 vest monthly over 36 months, about 20,833 shares a month. Mercury notes that 25% to 50% credit for time already served is negotiable at Series A. Beyond the headline schedule, Cooley GO tells founders to check when vesting starts, whether it accelerates on a termination without cause and whether it accelerates on a change of control. Double-trigger acceleration, which needs both a change of control and a termination without cause within a set window, is the common compromise.

No-shop and confidentiality

The model says plainly what binds you. The opening paragraph states that the no-shop and confidentiality provisions are binding “whether or not the financing is consummated,” that no other legally binding obligation arises until definitive agreements are signed, and that the term sheet is not a commitment to invest. The no-shop blocks the company and founders from soliciting or encouraging any other offer for a stated number of days, and requires them to tell the investors about inquiries.

The model leaves the number of days blank. Cooley GO says 30 to 45 days is plenty to finish a venture investment in almost all cases. Look for automatic extensions, and check whether the no-shop covers an acquisition of the company as well as new financing, which the model places in brackets. The term sheet also expires on a stated date if the company does not accept it, so the clock starts running before you sign anything.

Bracketed clauses that change the deal

  • Pay-to-play: in a later down round, holders who do not buy their pro rata share see their preferred convert to common. It keeps investors committed in a down round, which can help the company.
  • Redemption: the model’s optional version lets the Requisite Holders ask for their money back starting five years after closing, in three equal annual portions. Because it can push a company toward a sale to raise cash, it deserves attention.
  • Expenses: in the model the company pays legal and administrative costs of the financing, including reasonable investor counsel fees up to a cap in brackets. Ask for the cap in dollars.
  • Non-competes and nondisclosure: the model asks founders and key employees for a one-year non-competition agreement, Ask a lawyer whether that is enforceable where you operate.

How to negotiate the clauses

A VC term sheet has more clauses than a founder can fight over, so pick. Cooley GO’s “rule of 3” advises focusing on about three issues rather than contesting every line. Which three depends on the round: for many founders they are the price and option pool, the liquidation preference with its participation terms (a participating preferred pays the investor twice, a non-participating one pays it once), and the board. Investors read how a founder negotiates as a preview of the working relationship, so keep the tone factual. A fair trade is easier to land than a flat refusal, and you can negotiate term sheet terms in a single, organized reply instead of line by line over several weeks. A smaller pool for a longer vesting period, or a shorter exclusivity period in return for a faster close, gives the investor something back.

Timing matters as well. Once you sign the exclusivity clause, the other investors in the round are off limits for the period, so most of your leverage exists before you sign. Check each term against the investment amount and the stage of the startup: a clause that costs little in a $1 million round can matter in a $10 million one. A lawyer who reviews venture financings can say which terms depart from market and which do not.

A reading routine

  1. Read the binding language first, then the no-shop days and the expiry date.
  2. Convert price and pool into effective pre-money, as in the hypothetical above.
  3. Mark every bracket and alternative in the investor’s draft against the NVCA model to see what was added or removed.
  4. Draw the board and the vote counts as a diagram.
  5. Make a list of the vetoes, with the threshold for each.
  6. Run the exit math at three prices using the preference terms.
  7. Ask your lawyer for the clauses that depart from market practice, and negotiate those.

For the stage that usually brings these terms, see Series A explained. For what the investor will check after you sign, see due diligence and the data room.

Questions founders ask

Is the NVCA term sheet what investors will actually send? Often a shorter variant. It is a model, and your investor’s lawyer may use a firm template, so compare the two instead of assuming they match.

Which clauses can I leave alone? Registration rights and the IPO lock-up in the model’s investors’ rights section only come into play at an IPO. Price, pool, vetoes, board, vesting and the no-shop are the clauses that affect you from day one.

Can I negotiate a term after signing? The term sheet’s economic terms are not binding, but the investor expects them to carry through. Raising a new objection late in diligence costs trust, so raise your concerns before you sign. A startup that negotiates the term sheet carefully also gets a cleaner set of long-form documents.

Is the model different in Canada? The CVCA’s Canadian documents follow the NVCA structure, and the same clauses appear with local legal adaptations. Use the CVCA versions and Canadian counsel.

Sources and limits

  • NVCA, Model Term Sheet for a Series A preferred stock financing, 2020 version, nvca.org (document read in November 2026): the clause text and optional alternatives quoted above.
  • NVCA, “NVCA Releases 2025 Updates to Model Legal Documents,” October 2, 2025, nvca.org.
  • Canadian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, Model Legal Documents, cvca.ca (page read November 2026).
  • Cooley GO, “Negotiating term sheets,” cooleygo.com, last reviewed January 23, 2022.
  • Mercury, “Understanding the venture capital term sheet,” mercury.com, published March 2022 and updated May 2026.

We could not open the NVCA’s long-form documents for this page, only the term sheet and the announcement of the 2025 updates, so the clause text reflects the 2020 term sheet. The worked examples use invented numbers and ignore taxes and fees. Real documents differ by deal, state and country. This page is general information and not investment, legal or tax advice.