Case studies

Silicon Valley Bank failure: what startup CFOs should know

Silicon Valley Bank failed on March 10, 2023, after depositors pulled more than $40 billion in a single day. The Federal Reserve’s April 28, 2023 review ties the failure to a bank that held mostly uninsured deposits and long-dated securities. Regulators later protected all depositors under a systemic risk exception. This page records the documents, then gives treasury lessons for startups.

Scope and sources

The facts below come from the Federal Reserve Board’s “Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank” (April 28, 2023), SVB Financial Group’s Form 10-K for fiscal 2022 filed with the SEC, FDIC press releases dated March 10, March 13 and November 2023, a joint statement of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC dated March 12, 2023, and two FDIC and TreasuryDirect pages on insurance limits and Treasury bills. The Fed review calls itself a self-assessment, so treat it as the regulator describing its own work. Nothing here relies on press commentary. Where a number is our own arithmetic on filed figures, the text says so.

Timeline

Date What the documents record
2019 to 2021 The bank grows from $71 billion to over $211 billion in assets (Fed review)
December 31, 2022 Total assets $211.8 billion, total deposits $173.1 billion (10-K)
March 8, 2023 The group announces a $21 billion securities sale, a $1.8 billion after-tax loss and a plan to raise $2.25 billion; Silvergate also announces a wind-down
March 9, 2023 More than $40 billion in deposits leave; management expects over $100 billion more the next day
March 10, 2023 The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation closes the bank and names the FDIC receiver
March 12, 2023 Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC announce a systemic risk exception
March 13, 2023 Depositors get access to funds through a bridge bank
November 16, 2023 FDIC board approves the special assessment rule

What the Federal Reserve review says happened

The review’s first finding is that the board and management failed to manage risk. It says the bank failed its own internal liquidity stress tests beginning in July 2022, switched to less conservative assumptions, and removed interest rate hedges while rates were rising. The review adds that supervisors did not act forcefully enough.

Three features of the balance sheet matter most for a company that kept cash there.

Deposit concentration. The bank served mostly technology and life sciences clients and tripled in size between 2019 and 2021 as venture capital poured in. The review says those deposits were largely uninsured. At year-end 2022 about 94 percent of deposits were uninsured, against 41 percent for the large-bank peer average in the review’s table. The 10-K estimates $151.5 billion of uninsured deposits in U.S. offices, plus $13.9 billion of foreign deposits outside any U.S. insurance regime.

Long-dated securities. The bank put much of the cash into securities that mature far in the future. Its 10-K shows held-to-maturity securities carried at $91.3 billion with a fair value of $76.2 billion at December 31, 2022. The gap is about $15.2 billion (our subtraction of two filed numbers). The review explains that held-to-maturity classification lets a bank carry securities at amortized cost, so market losses are disclosed in notes but do not change the balance sheet value. Securities were 55 percent of assets, compared with 25 percent for peers, and 78 percent of them were held-to-maturity, compared with 42 percent for peers. Weighted-average duration of the held-to-maturity book was 6.2 years.

A concentrated network. The review says withdrawals came from “a concentrated network of venture capital investors and technology firms” who pulled money in a coordinated way, with social media playing a part. It compares the speed with 2008: it cites estimates of about $10 billion in outflows over eight days at Wachovia and $19 billion over 16 days at Washington Mutual. At SVB the outflow was over $40 billion in one day, with another $100 billion expected on March 10. The review says those two amounts together represented roughly 85 percent of the deposit base, and that SVB did not have enough cash or collateral to meet them.

The review also cites SVB’s own public documents, which say deposit outflows picked up in 2023 as clients burned through cash, before the March announcements.

Insurance limit and the systemic risk exception

The FDIC’s deposit insurance page states the standard rule: $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each account ownership category. Categories listed include single, joint, certain retirement, trust, employee benefit plan, corporation, partnership and unincorporated association, and government accounts. A company’s operating account falls under the corporation category, so all of its balances at one bank add up toward a single limit.

On March 10 the FDIC said it had created the Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara and moved insured deposits there. Its release said insured depositors would have full access by Monday, March 13, and that uninsured depositors would get an advance dividend within the following week plus a receivership certificate for the rest. By the FDIC’s count the bank had about $209.0 billion in assets and $175.4 billion in deposits on December 31, 2022; the 10-K reports consolidated figures, so the sets differ slightly.

Two days later the plan changed. The March 12 joint statement said the resolution “fully protects all depositors,” and that Treasury Secretary Yellen approved a systemic risk exception after recommendations from the FDIC and Federal Reserve boards and consultation with the President. On March 13 the FDIC said all deposits, insured and uninsured, and substantially all assets were moved to Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. The statements say no losses would fall on taxpayers and that any fund loss from protecting uninsured depositors would be recovered by a special assessment on banks. They describe a decision about two named banks and state no standing rule, so for a startup the $250,000 limit remains the rule.

In its November 2023 final rule the FDIC estimated about $16.3 billion of the cost of the SVB and Signature Bank failures went to protecting uninsured depositors. The assessment runs at an annual rate of 13.4 basis points on uninsured deposits reported at December 31, 2022, with the first $5 billion excluded, over an expected eight quarters. The FDIC estimated 114 banking organizations would pay and none under $5 billion in assets. Later estimates may differ and are not covered here.

A worked example (hypothetical)

Take a company with $6 million in operating cash and a monthly net burn of $400,000. That is 15 months of runway by the method in our burn rate and runway guide.

Setup Insured at the standard limit Share insured
All $6 million at one bank $250,000 4.2%
$2 million at each of three banks $750,000 12.5%

Spreading cash lifts the insured portion without covering most of it, so the next section lists several tools with different trade-offs. The $250,000 figure is the FDIC’s; the rest is arithmetic.

Practical treasury lessons

This section is our reading of the documents, not a finding by any agency, and it does not recommend a bank or product.

  1. Map where every dollar sits. List each account, bank, balance and ownership category, and compare each balance with the $250,000 limit. Refresh it weekly next to the 13-week cash flow forecast.
  2. Use more than one bank. Funds at a second bank stay reachable if the first is closed. The Fed review notes that SVB’s clients moved together; accounts at different institutions give a finance team a place to pay people from while one bank is frozen. Keep the second account open, funded and tested with a real payment.
  3. Understand deposit placement networks. Section 202 of a 2018 federal law, as described in the FDIC’s 2019 final rule preamble, defines reciprocal deposits as deposits a bank receives through a deposit placement network with the same maturity and aggregate amount as deposits it places at other member banks. The FDIC rule says the placed amounts are within the standard maximum deposit insurance amount. Programs sold as sweeps or insured networks work on that idea. Read the agreement for the list of participating banks, who holds the account, how fast funds come back and what fee the provider keeps, since those terms vary.
  4. Compare short-term Treasury bills with bank deposits. TreasuryDirect lists bill maturities of 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 26 and 52 weeks, sold at a discount or at par with face value paid at maturity. Matching bill maturities to the cash calendar shows how much cash is needed in which week. The page does not describe insurance, so those terms are a separate question for whoever holds the securities.
  5. Write a cash-access plan. The record shows a closure on a Friday morning and an access date on Monday. Decide beforehand which account pays payroll, who can sign, which backup account holds at least one payroll cycle and what the founders and the board are told in the first hour. Our guide to remote team payroll covers pay timing for distributed staff.
  6. Watch counterparty signals. SVB’s year-end 2022 10-K already showed the gap between carrying and fair value of its held-to-maturity securities. A quarterly read of a bank’s public filings is cheap compared with a frozen account.
  7. Give someone ownership. The question of who watches bank risk belongs with a named person. See when a startup needs a CFO, and for related missteps read top finance mistakes.

For a case where controls over cash failed in a different way, see the FTX bankruptcy record or browse the case studies section. Terms such as runway are defined in the glossary.

Questions readers ask

Were uninsured depositors paid in full? According to the March 12, 2023 joint statement and the FDIC’s March 13 release, all depositors were made whole through the systemic risk exception. The FDIC’s first plan, on March 10, was different, so the outcome changed over a weekend.

Does the $250,000 limit apply per account? The FDIC states it per depositor, per insured bank, for each ownership category. Several accounts in one category at one bank are combined.

Did the failure come from a loan problem? The Fed review links the failure to weak governance, liquidity and interest rate risk management, concentrated uninsured deposits and the run. Its peer table shows loans at 35 percent of assets, against 58 percent for peers.

Sources and limits

  • Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, April 28, 2023
  • SVB Financial Group, Form 10-K for fiscal year ended December 31, 2022, SEC EDGAR
  • FDIC press release on the closing of Silicon Valley Bank, March 10, 2023 (updated March 12, 2023)
  • FDIC press release on the Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., March 13, 2023
  • Joint statement by Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, March 12, 2023
  • FDIC press release on the special assessment final rule, November 2023
  • FDIC, Understanding Deposit Insurance, read in November 2026
  • FDIC, 2019 updated preamble to the reciprocal deposits final rule (updated March 8, 2019)
  • TreasuryDirect, Treasury Bills page, read in November 2026

Figures are as stated in these documents as of November 2026, and the $15.2 billion gap and the insured shares in the example are our arithmetic. Investor.gov bulletins on sweep programs returned an access error and were not used. This page is general information, not legal, tax or investment advice.